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избежать волнений на Яике, почему и находился в постоянном диалоге с казаками, а также старался сдер-
живать епархиальные власти, в их деятельности по искоренению старообрядчества [1, с. 340–341]. В вопросе 
распространения староверия среди яицких казаков, центральные духовные и светские власти склонялись к 
политике «невмешательства», приоритетной задачей было сохранение дееспособного войска. В тоже время, 
после розыска начала 1750-х гг. власти опасались спровоцировать волнения.
Примечания:
1 В источниках он фигурирует как Дионисьев, а в книге Н. С. Соколова как Денисов.
2 Позже епископ предлагал назначить вместо солдат для охраны отставных казаков.
3 Последний разделил мнение епископа о необходимости иметь «ученого протопопа в войске» [7, с. 19]
4 Видимо, после Максима Павлова протоиереем стал Петр Дионисьев.
5 О том, было ли это осуществлено, в источниках не говорится.
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MODERNIZATION AND ISLAM
Abstract. This article is based on the theory of modernization with bond of tradition and religion in context of Islam 
and Islamic societies by various modernists. Early scholars argued that modernity and tradition to be mutually 
exclusive. On the other hand, Most of theorists’ defined modernity and tradition as antagonistic forces but the idea 
was repealed in 1960s with a theory of relationship between religion (Islam) and modernity which justified that 
modernity and tradition can coexist and no longer contradictory. Islam has been taken to justify this theory in this 
article. It is usually supposed that Islam is hurdle in modernization and development. The article attempted to refute 
the view that Islam is hostile to modernity. The reason for developmental fail is western model of institutions which 
built have not rooted in, but often contrary to social and religious values that command the allegiance of the masses. 
It has been end up with a conclusion that modernity cannot be defined absolutely as secularization in case of Islam.
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In the period after World War II, the modernization school emerged as the most celebrated theoretical framework 
for the understanding of the third world in western social science. The modernization school saw post-colonial 
societies in a stage of transition from tradition to modernity, following the inauguration of colonial reforms and 
the installation of colonial institutions. This transition from tradition to modernity, resulting from colonial reforms 
and institutions, was perceived as part of a unilineal historical route of development originating in the Western 
European experience.
Early modernization scholars saw tradition and modernity to be mutually exclusive. The antagonism between 
tradition and modernity dates as far back as the Enlightenment. Marquis de Condorcet’s unilineal vision of progress 
condemned the past as use less and saw hope for human progress in the future. Also, Karl Marx’s version of 
Enlightenment, as expressed in his idea of dialectical conflict of material interests, repudiated the past and saw hope 
in future revolutionary change. Basing themselves on such assumptions, most scholars of third world development 
conceptualized modernity and tradition to be two antagonistic forces.
The assumption that tradition and modernity were contradictory rested on, as Lloyd and Susannc Rudolph 
observed, «Misdiagnosis of tradition as it is found in traditional societies, a misunderstanding of modernity as it is 
found in modern societies, and a misapprehension of the relationship between them» [12, p. 3].
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Such misdiagnosis of tradition and modernity was corrected, first, by cultural anthropologists in the mid-
1960s who saw that traditional societies were not as malleable as the early modernization theorists had thought. 
Development in one sphere, such as technology, did not necessarily bring concomitant changes in other spheres 
of the indigenous social system [6, p. 277]. On the other hand, the mere destruction of traditional values and 
institutions, such as family and community, did not ensure the development of a new and viable modern society. 
Rather, quite often the destruction of traditional forms tended to lead to disorganization, delinquency, and chaos 
instead of a viable rational order [3, p. 99].
Critics also found that kinship ties, religious beliefs, linguistic affiliations, communal bonds, which are typical 
forms of association in a traditional social order, did not entirely disappear even in the most highly industrialized 
societies [11, p. 326]. Moreover, later research revealed that modernity incorporates traditional aspects while 
traditional forms incorporate, at least, latent, deviant, or minority values, configurations, and structures that may fit 
a model of modernity [12, p. 5, 12]. Hence, modernity and tradition were found to be complementary and compatible. 
Not only that, revisionist scholarship also discovered that modernization does not necessarily mean development. 
According to this view, development refers to the institutionalization of modernity into traditions of national and 
cultural life. Without such institutionalization, modernization of a subsystem, for example, the military, may prove 
dysfunctional unless accompanied by the simultaneous growth of civil responsibility and tradition of an appropriate 
civil-military relationship [5, p. 287, 288]. Hence, it can be said, as Kothari argues: «Modern society is characterized 
by a belief in the rational and Scientific control of man’s physical and social environment and the application of 
technology to that end. One could thus define the process of modernization as one of secularization....» [6, p. 289].
In a similar vein, another author observed that in the process of transition from traditional societies to modern 
nation states, «The increasing secularization of society also exacts its toll on traditional religious beliefs, even though 
ritualized practices may continue long after they have lost their primary meanings. Defenders of traditional religions 
are confronted not only by the apathy of many who find little satisfaction in the ancient beliefs and practices, but 
also by a minority who view the traditional religions as definite obstacles to modernization» [4, p. 109–113].
By the late 1960s, however, the prevailing view on religion and modernity came to be questioned from within 
the modernization school. Some prominent modernization theorists recognized the adaptability and elasticity of 
traditional values and institutions as also their capacity to provide a meaningful basis for political integration and 
legitimation. As already observed, modernity and tradition no longer appeared as necessarily contradictory; now, 
it seemed that they could coexist.
The worldwide resurgence of Islam in the 1970s and 1980s made the relationship between tradition and 
modernity more complex. Modernization was supposed to have eliminated religion from public life. Instead, what 
occurred was a revival of religion as a political force, particularly in the Islamic world. The response to this problem, 
from the western perspective, has been that what has happened in the Muslim countries is the abandonment of 
modernity and that is what explains the resurgence of Islamic.
First of all, the lack of modernization in the Islamic world cannot be attributed to Islam. Both quantitative and 
qualitative studies on Islamic societies refute the view that Islam is hostile to modernization. El. Manoufi found 
in his survey of Egyptian villagers that Islam did not hinder development as generally assumed in western social 
science. The findings indicated, as El. Manoufi observed:
“Islam, embodied in religiosity, exercises no negative impact upon development. This contradicts the notion 
that Islam is responsible for the backwardness of Muslim societies and poses an obstacle to overall development. 
Religiosity, as the practical understanding of Islam, is a neutral factor in its relationship with development: it neither 
hinders nor furthers it [2, p. 148–156].
On the other hand, as Ragab contended: «Backwardness resulted from serious disruptions in the social 
organization of these societies by foreign domination for long periods. The stunted political, economic and social 
institutions of these societies are incapable of serving the needs of the population in a meaningful way. Genuine 
development of institutions in accordance with the sharia was halted for centuries. Foreign institutions that run 
against Sharia’s principles are imposed on people who experience a continuous acute conflict between what they 
hold to be the truth in their conscience and a dismal statuesque» [10, p. 519].
As a result, western models of development failed because the institutions they built have not been rooted in, 
but are often contrary to, social and religious values that command the allegiance of the masses [Ibid., p. 520].
On the other hand, it can be argued that it was not Islam but colonialism which made the Muslim countries 
(and the third world in general) underdeveloped. At the time of colonization there was not a very big gap between 
European states and many Afro-Asian countries in terms of economic infrastructure, accumulation of capital and 
the general standard of living. But such gaps had become very wide by the time of colonial withdrawal, as has 
concisely been noted in the context of India: «What is striking is the fact that at the beginning of British rule, India 
and Great Britain were at roughly equivalent levels of economic well-being, but by the 20th century the latter was a 
developed industrial country while the former not only remained primarily an agricultural country but also, with its 
integration into the world economic system as an agricultural dependency, subjected to great economic fluctuation 
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and consequent grave economic distress. ... the development of Great Britain is related – and it could not but be 
related given the two economic systems were so closely integrated – to the underdevelopment of India» [8, p. 110].
Another perspective is that, while modernization and Islam are accommodative, Islamic modernization is not 
similar to secular-oriented western modernization. As Fazlur Rahman, a contemporary authority on Islam, has 
argued: «It should be noted that Islamic modernism is not equivalent to secularism, even though so many western...
political scientists...identify the two. They assume that all modernization is secularization, which is palpably untrue 
in case of Islam» [13, p. 160].
James Piscatori observed, in the same vein, that the view that Islam stifled the process of development owed 
much to Marx and something to Durkheim, who related nation-building to secularization. According to Piscatori, the 
recent experience of the Islamic world demonstrated a great deal of development under the leadership of orthodox 
Muslim elites, such as Saudi Arabia, as well as radical ones, such as Libya and Iran [9, p. 117]. Thus development 
could take place under Islamic leadership. On the other hand, substantial modernization does not necessarily lead to 
secularization. For example, Iran in the 1960s and 1970s experienced extensive modernization, including substantial 
investments in heavy industry and infrastructure, urbanization, expansion of literacy and formal education, growth 
of communications and mass media [1, p. 302]. But these modernizing achievements failed to establish secular values 
and institutions. It can therefore be contended, as Ali Banuazizi does, that: «The structural changes accompanying 
modernization do not necessarily bring about secularism, either at the level of political institutions and processes 
or in the attitudes and values of individuals who have been exposed to modernizing experiences» [1, p. 305–306].
Conclusion. Thus, the view that lack of modernization opened the space for a resurgence of Islam in the socio-
political sphere is indefensible. On the other hand, it is true that rapid modernization tends to evoke opposition from 
traditional forces, and this conservative reaction results in the resurgence of traditional values and movements. But 
Islamic resurgence is not a phenomenon limited to only those societies that have experienced rapid modernization, 
such as Iran; it also pervades societies with a low level of modernization, such as Pakistan. This has been so because 
the Muslim masses are in a quest for authenticity in the wake of the failure of, and conflicts caused by, alien models 
of development. They do not want transplantation of western institutions. Rather, they want to adapt them to 
Islamic norms or innovate their own ones in accordance with Islamic tradition. Hence, it is important to look for 
causal relationships beyond either the lack of modernization or the presence of rapid modernization in investigating 
the reversal in the state ideology of Pakistan from secularism to Islam.
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